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SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
AND THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES
Ronald L. Carlson*
INTRODUCTION

N ANALYZING THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, the drafting
work of the Advisory Committee should not be overlooked. 1 This is easy to
do when any particular rule is isolated and criticized. For the most part, the
total rules package prepared by the Advisory Committee represents a commendable effort to provide a needed set of uniform rules for federal trials.
The ideas contained in the new rules are almost invariably well researched.
When oversights or omissions in treatment do appear, however, it is well
to raise these points for discussion. Congress is reviewing the Proposed Federal Rules, and the final legislative draft can be strengthened by prudent
2
Congressional adjustments.
One area of concern is the appropriate scope of cross-examination. The
tradition in federal courts and in most state courts has been to limit the
scope of cross-examination to matters testified to on direct, plus matters
bearing on the credibility of the witness. 3 The Advisory Committee sought
to change this. Under their proposed approach, "wide open" cross-examination of witnesses would have become the norm in federal trials. More recently in the draft of the rules prepared by the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, the traditional rule of narrow crossexamination has been reinstated. 4 This Article asks which of the competing
approaches is preferable, and asks particularly in criminal cases whether
the Advisory Committee's "wide open" approach is even constitutional.
Posing the key question directly, when an accused person takes the stand in
a federal criminal trial, may the range of the questioning by the prosecutor
extend beyond the scope of the direct in cross-examining the defendant?
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. The Varying Forms of Rule 611(b): Adaptations Made from Time to
Time by the FederalRules Advisory Committee.
Any discussion must begin with a look at the rule in question, and in
this case at the separate prior rule drafts. In the original 1969 draft of the
*Member of the Bars of Iowa, Illinois, and the District of Columbia.

'The Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates (hereafter referred to as
Proposed Federal Rules) were drafted by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of
the United States.
'The rules have been approved by the United States Supreme Court and are pending before Congress. They become effective upon approval by Congress, with whatever amendments Congress may make. On some matters wherein
sharp disagreement marked the committee's deliberations, the Advisory Committee chairman implicitly extended an
invitation to Congress to finally resolve the question. See note 6 infra and accompanying text.
'Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611 (b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 274 (1972).
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,as amended by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Committee on the
judiciary.
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Proposed Federal Rules, the traditional American view of narrow crossexamination was retained by the Advisory Committee. The drafting committee's 1969 proposal provided as follows: "Cross-examination should be
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness. The judge may in the exercise of discretion
permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." 5 Then
in the 1971 draft the Advisory Committee switched to the "wide open" view,
and this ultimately became the committee's final approach. In the form presented to the Supreme Court and Congress, Proposed Rule 611(b) provided
as follows:
Scope of cross-examination. A witness may be cross-examined on any matter
relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. In the interests of justice, the
judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct
examination.

The last sentence of the Advisory Committee's 1971 rule would have
allowed narrow cross-examination in limited circumstances. Those were
situations where the result otherwise would have been confusion, complication, or protraction of the case. Such circumstances depended upon individual developments in a particular case, and the narrow cross-examination
clause did not apply as a matter of rule to any discrete category of witnesses.
More specifically, the Advisory Committee's rule clearly did not indicate
that limited cross-examination was the required approach when an accused
person testified in a criminal case, nor did the Advisory Committee's Note
convey this information. The message which came through from the Advisory
Committee's 1971 draft was that "wide open" cross-examination should be
the norm for witnesses in all federal trials, save in exceptional circumstances
(just as the 1969 draft would have dictated narrow cross as the general norm,
with discretion in the court to allow "wide open" cross).
The recent Congressional hearings reveal the narrow one-vote margin
by which the drafting committee changed to the "wide open" view. In the
following exchange, Chairman Albert Jenner of the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee initially indicated that on a few close questions, including one
controversy involving a particular application of the attorney-client privilege,
the drafting committee "removed that from the draft and left it open for the
Congress." 6 House Judiciary Committee member H. P. Smith (N.Y.) wanted
to know if there were other similar areas:

5The Advisory Committee noted in 1969 that such a rule "promotes orderly presentation of the case." Advisory
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (Prelim. Draft 1969). It was this 1969 Rule language which the House subcommittee picked up and reinstated in its print draft. See note 4 supra and note 48 infra and accompanying text. In
the 1971 and later Advisory Committee drafts "wide open" cross was instituted, with narrow cross available in limited
situations as indicated in Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611 (b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 275 (1972):
The provision of the second sentence, that the judge may in the interests of justice limit inquiry into new
matters on cross-examination, is designed for those situations in which the result otherwise would be confusion, complication, or protraction of the case, not as a matter of rule but as demonstrable in the actual development of the particular case.
'Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Ist Sess. on Proposed Rules of Evidence 526 (1973). Mr. Cleary
in the subsequent passage is Prof. Edward Cleary, Reporter to the Advisory Committee; Judge Albert Maris is chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
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Mr. SMITH. I assume there are other areas in which the committee originally
had a consensus which perhaps has been withdrawn at this time where you may now
think it is proper for the Congress to make a decision.
Are there some other areas besides this attorney-client area?
Mr. JENNER. The committee went up the mountain and down the mountain
on the question of the scope of cross-examination. The rule in the Federal court
today is and has been that the scope of cross-examination is limited to the scope of
the direct examination....
Now, there is an area in which the Congress and you may very well [sic]-it is a
close question. Litigators are of the view that the scope of cross should be limited to
the direct. The scholars in their great wisdom feel that it should be wide open as it
is now.
Mr. CLEARY. I think we could probably align the judges on our side, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. JENNER. Align those judges who had not been litigators before they
assumed the bench.
Mr. HUNGATE. They will have to qualify as scholars then, won't they?
Mr. SMITH. On your final option was it still a one vote decision?
Mr. JENNER. Yes, it was, one vote.
Judge MARLS. It was one vote in the Advisory Committee. It was by one vote
in the Standing Committee. We approved the draft that the majority of that committee had presented.
Mr. JENNER. Yes. We did not debate that in the Standing Committee, but
that is an example.

The Advisory Committee debate reflects an ongoing concern among evidence experts and in the courts over which rule should prevail. Accordingly,
it is appropriate to turn to court decisions which provide the historical background.
2. Court Decisions.
There are two major views on scope of cross-examination. 7 The American (or federal) rule limits cross-examination of the witness to matters stated
in the direct examination. Another view, termed the Massachusetts (or
English) rule by many writers, allows cross-examination on all relevant
phases of the case. Several jurisdictions follow this broad interrogation rule
and require a witness to answer cross-examination questions which inquire
into matters foreign to the witness' testimony in chief.
The competing rules have received independent evaluation and rest
upon different theories. The Massachusetts rule was brought from England.
In both civil and criminal cases this rule is based on the philosophy that
when a witness testifies, he should present all the facts unrestricted by
technical rules of evidence. Court and counsel are relieved of the duty of
determining when questions are within the proper scope of cross-examination
and when they are without. This ease of application was a major factor in
winning Wigmore's support for the rule. 8

'Much of the historical analysis contained in this section of the Article is drawn from Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell L. Q. 705 (1967). See also Ladd and Carlson, Cases and Materials on Evidence 130-146
(1972).
86 Wigmore, Evidence § 1888, at 544-45 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore was critical of the federal rule and obJected to
its application as the American rule, despite its operation in the vast majority of American jurisdictions.
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An argument often advanced on behalf of the more limited American
rule is that it makes for orderliness of trial. 9 A party may not develop a
major portion of his case out of normal order through the vehicle of crossexamination. It has also been suggested that there is an element of basic
fairness in preventing the cross-examiner from using a witness called by the
opposition to establish his own case through the device of leading
questions. 10 The Supreme Court's past solicitude for the limited rule is
evidenced by its rejection of a proposed provision for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which would have permitted cross-examination on every material matter in the case regardless of the scope of direct examination.I
The limited American rule gained early impetus from an 1840 decision
wherein the Supreme Court indicated "that a party has no right to crossexamine any witness except as to facts and circumstances connected with the
matter stated in his direct examination."' 12 The rule spread rapidly 3 and
'As noted, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee in the 1969 Rules draft indicated that there was merit to the
"orderly presentation of the case" argument supporting the American rule. See note 5 supra.
"The United States Supreme Court made this early comment supporting the limited rule in Wills v. Russell, 100
U.S. 621, 625-26 (1879):
Authorities of the highest character show that the established rule of practice in the Federal courts and in
most other jurisdictions in this country is that a party has no right to cross-examine a witness, without leave
of the court, as to any facts and circumstances not connected with matters stated in his direct examination,
subject to two necessary exceptions. He may ask questions to show bias or prejudice in the witness, or to lay
the foundation to admit evidence of prior contradictory statements .....
It has been twice so ruled by this court, and is undoubtedly a valuable rule of practice, and one well calculated to promote regula ity and logical order in jury trials....
"The Court struck down the concluding sentence from the Civil Procedure Advisory Committee's 1937 draft of
Rule 43(b) which read: "Except as stated in the last preceding sentence, any witness called by a party and examined
as to any matter material to any issue may be cross-examined by the adverse party upon all matters material to every
issue of the action." In proposing amendments to the Rules in 1946 the Advisory Committee did not recommend any
amendment to Rule 43. The Committee commented that the rule was working better than the commentators had expected. 5 Moore, Federal Practice 43.01 [7] (2d ed. 1971).
The rejection of the wide open rule by the Supreme Court was discussed in Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302,
310-11 (4th Cir. 1950):
This rule [limited cross-examinationI has been the subject of some attack; and an attempt was made by
Advisory Committee when formulating the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1936 and 1937 to change the rule to
allow cross examination upon all the material and pertinent issues of the action. The Supreme Court in rejecting these proposals and in adopting Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,. . as it now stands,
indicate that "the historic limitation upon the scope of cross examination to the subject matter of the direct
examination is still to be enforced in the federal courts.
See also Special Committee on Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States, "Preliminary Study of the
Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts," 30 F.R.D. 79, 97-98 (1961).
t
1 Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840). This Supreme Court decision was preceded by a Pennsylvania opinion of major import wherein Chief Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted the limited rule of cross-examination. Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 S. & R. 72 (Pa. 1827). See 6 Wigmore § 1885.
"McCormick's findings indicate that the American rule prevails in about four-fifths of the states. McCormick,
Evidence § 21 (1972). For the state of the law in various jurisdictions see 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 446 (1972);
6 Wigmore § 1890. It is interesting to note that in Missouri, where the wide open practice prevails in civil cases, the
accused in criminal matters is shielded from cross-examination except upon matters referred to in the examination in
chief. See Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 491.070, 546.260 (1952).
Wigmore sought to group all jurisdictions into three categories, including in addition to the two cross-examination
rules already discussed the so-called "Michigan rule." This would permit broad cross-examination of the witness as to
everything save the cross-examiner's affirmative case. 6 Wigmore § 1889. Morgan, however, notes that what Wigmore
called the Michigan rule does not exist in Michigan. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 66 (1963); see Comment,
Cross-Examination: Permissible Scope in Michigan, 36 U. Det. LJ. 162 (1958). See also Annots., Right to Cross Examine Witness in Respect of Facts Not Included in His Direct Examination, 108 A.L.R. 167 (1937); Cross-Examination of Witness Called To Testify on Particular Point or Under Order of Court, 7 A.L.R. 1116, 1125 (1920) (developing
the minority rule and listing Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Mississippi thereunder); 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses
§ 629 (1948); 98 C.J. S. Witnesses § 378 (b) (1957).
Although attempts at classification of jurisdictions have been criticized because of the various approaches employed in the several states using the American rule, such classifications continue. See Maguire, Weinstein, Chadbourn
& Mansfield, Cases on Evidence 411 (6th ed. 1973); Note, The Limiting Effect of Direct Examination Upon the Scope
of Cross Examination, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1937).
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was applied fully in federal criminal cases. Significantly, certain decisions
treating the rule in criminal prosecutions suggested that its application was
4
not merely appropriate trial procedure, but had a basis in the constitution.1
After the adoption of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in 1789, the federal courts proceeded to make its written protections meaningful. Early decisions had no occasion to consider whether the
limited cross-examination rule was required by the fifth amendment in criminal cases. The question of the extent of a testifying defendant's waiver of his
constitutional privilege did not confront the courts in this context for some
time. When this question was ultimately reached, a body of federal authority
developed attributing constitutional dignity to the limited rule.
Tucker v. United States15 is an example from this line of precedent.
In Tucker, the defendant and others were charged with using the mails to
promote fraud. The indictment alleged that they mailed newspapers containing advertisements instrumental to a fraudulent scheme at a United
States Post Office. It was essential for the government to prove that a fraudulent scheme existed and that in the execution thereof the defendant caused
the advertisements to be inserted in the paper. At trial the defendant's direct
testimony went wholly to refuting the existence of any fraudulent scheme;
he at no time went into the issue concerning the insertion of ads in the newspaper. On cross-examination he was asked if he inserted the advertisements
as charged. Over objection that such question was outside the scope of the
direct examination and therefore compelled the defendant to be a witness
against himself, the trial court required the defendant to answer. After
citing pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court, the court of appeals reversed
in terse language:
The questions asked the witness Dudley Tucker on cross-examination were
clearly outside the scope of his direct testimony. They had reference to the second
element of the offenses charged, while his direct examination was limited to a refutation of the first element. The questions on cross-examination did not in any way
test the truth of the direct examination; they did not seek to explain or modify the
same; they were asked for the sole purpose of proving an independent element in the
government's case. In eliciting the answers to the questions propounded to Dudley
Tucker with reference to the insertion of the advertisements, the government made

I'lt should be noted that the question of the scope of cross-examination and that of the scope of waiver of the
privilege are separate and distinct. See Morgan, note 13 supra, at 179-80. Although both may serve to limit crossexamination, the former operates by virtue of statutory or decisional authority, whereas the latter expresses a constitutional concept. The interaction of the two principles occurs when the accused takes the witness stand. If the scope of
waiver is limited, i.e., if the privilege is waived only as to matters testified to on direct examination, the rule of limited
cross-examination may operate as an ancillary procedural device to implement such a concept of waiver and prevent
cross-examination offensive to the constitutional privilege. Of course, a jurisdiction can apply a broad waiver rule and
deem the privilege destroyed as to every matter relevant to the merits, yet employ the limited cross-examination rule
as a procedural device. But the converse does not appear equally true. A jurisdiction applying a narrow waiver rule may
be prohibited by privilege considerations from applying a rule of wide-open cross-examination of the accused since such
interrogations, exceeding the boundaries of the waiver, delve into matter respecting which the privilege has not been
waived. See Note, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 116 (1937). Applying the wide-open cross-examination rule in this situation and
requiring the defendant to respond may compel him to sepak in derogation of his privilege of silence.
Intimations that a limited cross-examination rule may be required by the fifth amendment do not elevate the currently-operating federal cross-examination rule as such to the level of a constitutional standard. What is implied is that
the operative rule governing the scope of cross-examination must not be inconsistent with the applicable waiver rule.
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Dudley Tucker its witness, and compelled him over seasonable and proper objection
to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. There is no higher nor more important duty resting upon the courts than to
is fully afforded the rights and immunities guaranteed to him by
see that the citizen
6
the Constitution. '

As the court observed during its discussion, the facts surrounding the
historical origin of the privilege against self-incrimination shed little light on
this problem. The history of the privilege extends into the early years of the
common law to a time when an accused could not testify on his own behalf.
The first American statute according the defendant capacity to give evidence
was not enacted until 1864.17 In 1878 Congress, by statute, provided that a
person charged with a federal offense could be a competent witness at his
trial. 18 Following this grant of capacity to testify, it became relevant to
explore the protective boundaries of a defendant's privilege at trial. The
Tucker court reasoned that the federal exclusion of compulsory self-incrimination prohibited forced disclosure on issues foreign to the defendant's direct
testimony:
If there is good reason why a defendant should not be compelled to be a witness
against himself, there ought to be equally good reason why, if he has testified voluntarily upon one issue, he should not be compelled to testify against his will concerning matters wholly unrelated to that issue, which would not be within the scope
9
of proper cross-examination if he were an ordinary witness.'

The above decision relied in part on the prior case of Harrold v. Territory of Oklahoma,20 which construed the defendant's privilege in this way:
He may not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." When he testifies as a witness he waives this privilege of silence and subjects
himself to cross-examination and impeachment to the same extent as any other witness would subject himself thereto in the same situation, but no farther. He may be
cross-examined upon the subjects of his direct examination, but not upon other
subjects. . .An accused person who testifies to the single fact that a bill of sale or a
deed was signed by the grantor does not thereby waive his privilege to refuse to
testify upon every other material issue in his case. He waives his privilege of silence
upon the sul:jects relative to which he testifies, but upon no other."'

This approach applies the philosophy that a defendant who has not
used his testimony to advantage himself on a particular issue may not be
cross-examined on that issue. The defendant has not produced favorable selftestimony on a point, then unfairly tried to block any probing of that point.
Rather, he has maintained his silence. Although he may have testified as to
some matters, nonetheless his silence is unbroken on a distinct issue in the
155 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925).
"I1d.at 824.
"7SeeNote, Griffin v. California, 70 Dick. L. Rev. 98, 100 (1965).

120 Stat. 30 (1878), as amended 62 Stat. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964).

1'ucker

v. United States, 5 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1925). It appears that cross-examination only on matters

relevant to the direct operates to limit interrogation of the accused much more than cross-examination on all matters
relevant to the case. Wigmore expressed preference for broad interrogation, and for the view that voluntary taking of
the witness stand by an accused constitutes a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination as to all relevant
matters. 8 Wigmore § 2276(2), at 459-62 The American view limits the waiver to matters testified about on direct
examination. Wigmore urges that courts operating in American view jurisdictions to produce a waiver identical in scope
to the broad waiver rule by using the theory that the suhject of the direct examination of an accused is the whole fact
of guilt or innocence- Id. at 467- The Tucker case appears to reject such an application.
°169 Fed. 47 (8th Cir. 1909).
iId. at 51.
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case just as much as if he had never taken the stand. In these circumstances,
it is error to permit the prosecutor to probe the sealed area through crossexamination questions.
Other federal cases supporting this general approach may be added to
the above.2 2 A 1966 court of appeals decision asserts that the extent of the
accused's waiver of the privilege at trial is determined by his direct testimony. This case, United States ex rel. Irwin v. Pate,23 notes that if a defendant takes the stand in a criminal case, he waives the privilege against
self-incrimination to the extent of his direct examination. In support of its
ruling the court cited two United States Supreme Court decisions, Fitzpatrick
v. United States24 and Brown v. United States. 25 These cases will be discussed next.
Of the Supreme Court cases, Fitzpatrick v. United States26 is one of the
most significant. The defendant, convicted of murder in the federal District
Court for Alaska, argued that his privilege against self-incrimination had
been violated by the trial court's failure to restrict the cross-examination
when he testified. 27 After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court, holding
that the cross-examination of the accused did not exceed the direct, affirmed
the conviction. In so doing it set forth the constitutional guidelines governing
a defendant's waiver of the federal privilege at trial:
Where an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence, takes the
stand in his own behalf and makes his own statement, it is clear that the prosecution
has a right to cross-examine him upon such statement with the same latitude as
would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness, as to the circumstances connecting him with the alleged crime. While no inference of guilt can be drawn from
his refusal to avail himself of the privilege of testifying, he has no right to set forth
to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a
cross-examination upon these facts. . . .If the prosecution should go farther and
compel the defendant, on cross-examination, to write his own name or that of another person, when he had not testified in reference thereto in his direct examination, the case of State v. Lurch, 12 Oregon 99, is authority for saying that this
2

See United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35, 38 n.5 (7th Cir. 1968) ("prior decisions (in this circuit)
• . .as well as the writings of the commentators, e.g., Carlson, Cross Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell L. Q. 705
(1967), seem to embrace the doctrine of a partial waiver of fifth amendment rights."). Cases are collected in Carlson,
Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell L. Q. 705 (1967); Cipes, Criminal Defense Techniques § 24.05 (1973).
In Wilson v. United States, 4 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1925), a federal prosecution for illegal possession and sale of
liquor, the direct examination of the defendant did not inquire into her alleged possession of alcohol. Over objection,
questions were propounded to the defendant on cross-examination outside the scope of the examination in chief. The
court reversed defendant's conviction and in so doing left no doubt that the reversal was based on constitutional
grounds:
The defendant, if the witnesses are to be believed, is guilty; but she herself, by grossly improper crossexamination, wholly outside of her examination in chief, was made to disclose facts showing her possession of
beer, alcohol, and mash....
Some of this cross-examination may be excusable, upon the ground that the government is not to be confined in cross-examination to a mere categorical reiteration of the testimony of a defendant given in his examination in chief (State v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 56 S.W. 907; State v. Corrigan, 262 Mo. 195, 171 S.W. 51);
but the greater part of it is inexcusable upon any ground consistent with the rules that a defendant is entitled
to a fair trial, and that he may not be compelled to be a witness against himself. Id. at 889. (Emphasis added.)
23357 F.2d 911, 915-16 (7th Cir. 1966). Two years later the court reiterated its view in United States v. Guajardo-

Melendez, note 22 supra.
2"178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).
25356 U.S. 148 (1958).

-178 U.S. 304 (1900).
"Id. at 314-15.
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would be error. It would be a clear case of the defendant being compelled to furnish
original evidence against himself. State v. Saunders, 14 Oregon 300, is also authori-

ty for the proposition that he cannot
be compelled to answer as to any facts not
28
relevant to his direct examination.

In Fitzpatrick the defendant's waiver apparently was complete as to
matters stated in the direct examination, and cross-examination could fully
explore the details of matters previously covered. But the waiver was also
limited by the direct examination. Requiring an accused to respond to crossexamination questions covering matters wholly outside the examination in
chief, albeit material to the case, would improperly compel him to be a witness against himself. 9
In 1958, several years after Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court again had
occasion to discuss the problem in the important case of Brown v. United
States.30 In Brown the defendant took the stand in a denaturalization proceeding and on cross-examination by the Government refused to answer
questions respecting communist associations. Analyzing the constitutional
privilege in this setting, Justice Frankfurter adverted to Fitzpatrick v.
United States and pointed out that a defendant has no right to set forth all
the facts in his favor without laying himself open to cross-examination on
those facts. 3 1 The opinion contains relevant comments which seem to indicate that waiver of the fifth amendment privilege extends to matters opened
up by the party on direct examination, but perhaps only that far. In this
connection, Justice Frankfurter's summary of the law applicable to criminal
defendants who testify in their own behalf is instructive:
Our problem is illumined by the situation of a defendant in a criminal case.
If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth
of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. "[Hie has no
right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts." Fitzpatrick v. United States,
178 U.S. 304, 315; and see Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 304-305. The
reasoning of these cases applies to a witness in any proceeding who voluntarily takes
the stand and offers testimony in his own behalf. It is reasoning that controls the
32
result in the case before us.

5

' 1d. at 315-316. (Emphasis added.)
2

This is the construction placed upon Fitzpatrick by the Tucker and Harrold cases. See text accompanying notes
15-21 supra.
Justice Brown in the Fitzpatrick opinion approved the Oregon rule, which held that freedom from compulsory
self-incrimination was violated when cross-examination of the accused was extended beyond the facts to which he had
originally testified. As stated in State v. Lurch, 12 Ore. 99, 103 (1885), statutes allowing the accused to be a witness
do not compel him to be a witness against himself:
[lit would be a great violation of good faith to permit the State to take advantage of his situation and
change the trial into an inquisition. The cross-examination in such cases must be strictly confined to the facts
testified to by the accused. The law throws around him in such case an immunity which ought to be sacredly
maintained.

Ibid.
-°356 U.S. 148 (1958). In the years intervening between Fitzpatrick and Brown, although still citing Fitzpatrick,
the Supreme Court wavered from its clear language. See e.g., Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (dictum
implying broad waiver).
3"Brown v. United States, note 30 supra, at 155.
321d. at 154-55.
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The above passage indicates that the reasoning of the Fitzpatrick decision is controlling. But in addition to the reliance on Fitzpatrick, another
feature of the Brown opinion is striking. The decision emphasized that the
witness himself, if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry.33 It would appear that a party can only control the area of
disclosure so referred to when the cross-examination is confined to the direct
examination. Wide open cross examination of the accused may range well
beyond the scope of the direct, and beyond the party's control.
Commentators have summarized Brown as espousing a constitutional
rule of limited waiver. 34 It is interesting to note, moreover, that Brown
was cited by the Seventh Circuit as imposing constitutional limitations on
35
cross-examination in criminal prosecutions.
Such decisions and others of similar import prompted one commentator
to conclude:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the statute of 1878
permitting the defendant to testify have been construed as requiring a restrictive
cross-examination. 36

"Id. at 155. It is noted that courts applying a narrow theory of waiver nonetheless permit impeachment as an
incident of the direct examination. See note 10 supra. This possibility appears to give pause to dissenting Justice
Black, who scrutinizes the majority statement that it is the defendant, as a witness, who determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry:
I do not believe this assumption is correct. While it is true that a party can determine the area of his own
disclosures on direct examination, the scope of permissible cross-examination is not restricted to the matters
raised on direct but may include other and quite different matters if they will aid the court or jury to appraise
the credibility of the witness and the probative value of his testimony. Id. at 159 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Brennan also dissented, and commented that a rule decreeing waiver of privilege by merely taking the
stand developed as a historical corollary of the fact that the accused could not be called as a witness. The Brennan
dissent does not explore the scope of waiver, but should this dissent be construed as indicating complete waiver by an
accused on all material matters regardless of the scope of direct examination, such construction would appear to miss
the distinct point made by the majority. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
42-43 (1949). A careful annotation of the problem contained in the Brown case appears in 72 A.L.R.2d 818, 833, 841
(1960).
34E.g., Note, 37 Texas L. Rev. 343, 344 (1959). See also The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77,
177 (1958), wherein the Brown case is summarized as holding that a defendant who voluntarily takes the stand waives
the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of cross-examination on matters raised by his own testimony on
direct,
The doctrine of limited waiver is recognized elsewhere in the law of evidence. Most of the authorities agree that
if the accused takes the stand for the purpose of testifying on a preliminary question, such as the voluntariness of a
confession, this is not to be taken as a complete waiver. Many cases limit the waiver to the particular issue, because
it is felt that to do otherwise would penalize the defendant for testifying. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968). See also McCormick, Evidence § 131 (1972), Maguire, Evidence of Guilt § 2.082(2) (1959); Model Code of
Evidence rule 108, comment (1942). The discussion contained in the body of this article deals with testimony on the
merits, as opposed to testimony on preliminary matters.
In addition, it is noted that testimony in one proceeding, or one stage of a proceeding, which testimony incorporates the fullest disclosure, does not waive the privilege in a later proceeding or stage. Maguire, supra, § 2.082(1).
35United States ex eel. Irwin v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915-16 (7th Cir. 1966). In reviewing a criminal conviction,
the court carefully noted that the cross-examination of the defendant who testified was related to his direct testimony.
The court went on to state:
In a criminal case, if a defendant voluntarily takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, his testimony
may be impeached and he may be cross-examined. The extent of the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is determined by what the defendant's testimony make relevant for cross-examination. Id. at 915.
See note 22 supra.
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Supreme Court demonstrated marked hostility to rules interfering with free exercise of testimonial rights by accused persons. A Tennessee statute provided that if a defendant
elected to take the stand he was required to testify before other witnesses for the defense. The Court nullified this
statute on two grounds, (1) that it was an impermissible restriction on the exercise of an accused's privilege against
self-incrimination, and (2) that it violated due process in that the result was to deprive the defendant of the guiding
hand of counsel in making the decision whether to take the stand.
360rfield, Examination of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 4 Ariz. L. Rev. 215, 240 (1962).
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In summary, several federal decisions contain distinct indications to the
effect that a limited cross-examination of the accused is required by the fifth
amendment. Much of the language militates in the direction of extending the
waiver of the constitutional privilege to matters opened up on direct examination, but not beyond.
3. The ConstitutionalIssue.
The constitutional question raised by the cases heretofor reviewed is
quite clear: Does a federal prosecutor have a right to cross-examine an accused person on issues foreign to the witness' direct testimony, an arguably
allowable procedure under the language of Proposed Federal Rule 611(b)
as submitted to Congress. 37 Contrary to the proposed rule, much decisional
authority would seem to indicate that the prosecutor does not have such a
right. For this reason, if the Advisory Committee's suggested "wide open"
approach to cross-examination had prevailed, its application in criminal
cases might have been costly. Judges and prosecutors might have been led
into error in the very possible event that the constitutional thesis advanced
by the previously-detailed cases 38 proved to be the controlling interpretation. The constitutional problem is succinctly summarized in the 1972 edition
39
of McCormick on Evidence:
Regardless of whether the result under the restrictive rule may be desirable, it
may be that the scope of cross-examination of the accused in a criminal case is not
controlled solely by evidence case law, and statutes or rules governing the matter.
The outer limits of cross-examination may well be controlled, at least in the future,
by constitutional doctrine concerning the extent to which the accused waives his
privilege of self-incrimination by taking the stand and testifying.4 0 Some judicial
language suggests that under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
the waiver should extend only to questioning concerning matters mentioned upon
direct examination. If this position ultimately prevails, state practice would be
governed by the constitutional limits of waiver, making "wide-open" cross-examination of criminal defendants, and perhaps even extremely liberal restrictive rules,
unconstitutional.
SOLUTIONS

Contrary to one view which holds that the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence do not purport to resolve constitutional evidence questions, in some
instances it is virtually imperative that they do soi Indeed, several constitutional principles have been treated in the rules. Consider, for example,
this statement on waiver of constitutional privilege in the note to Rule 611
(b), a statement authored by the Federal Advisory Committee: "Under
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247
(1968), no general waiver occurs when the accused testifies on such preliminary matters as the validity of a search and seizure or the admissibility of a
confession. Rule 104(d), supra." By this statement, as well as the inclusion
3Fed. R. Evid. 611 (b) (1973). See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
mSee notes 15-36 supra.

39'.%cCormick, Evidence 53-54 (1972).
"0See discussion in Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell L.Q. 705 (1967).
4'Hearings, note 6 supra, at 391.
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of Rule 104, the Advisory Committee recognized two points: (1) The Supreme Court of the United States has embraced the doctrine of partial waiver
of fifth amendment rights; and (2) the new evidence rules must adhere to
42
constitutional requirements.
Prior court decisions suggest that the proper rule for cross-examination
of accused persons is a constitutional issue and not merely a question of good
trial procedure. If there are constitutional implications, the final form of
Federal Rule 611(b) must adequately accommodate constitutional requirements. Strictly applied, every accused person who took the stand under the
Advisory Committee's draft was subject to "wide open" cross-examination.
43
Yet, as pointed out in a note to United States v. Guajardo-Melende,
"prior decisions (in this circuit). . .as well as the writings of the commentators, e.g., Carlson, Cross Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell L. Q.
705 (1967), seem to embrace the doctrine of a partial waiver of fifth amendment rights." Consideration of potential amendments of Rule 611(b) would
appear to be in order.
1. Reserving the Narrow Rule for Criminal Trials.
There is the possibility of preparing a rule which allows broad interrogation for civil cases and ordinary witnesses generally, with provision to
invoke the narrow rule for accused persons in criminal cases. 4 This approach to conforming Proposed Federal Rule 611(b) to constitutional necessities would explicitly exempt accused persons from "wide open" crossexamination. Under this approach, a reservation of Fifth Amendment rights
could have been added to the Advisory Committee's draft of Rule 611(b) in
this manner:
Except for accused persons, a witness may be cross-examined on any matter
relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. In the interests of justice, the

judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct
examination.

A note to the Rule could advert to the point made by certain of the cases
previously detailed, to the effect that examination of criminal case defendants
must be controlled by the traditional American rule.
2. Across-the-Board Return to the Narrow.
A second proposal for revision of Rule 611(b) would not only cure the
constitutional defects noted here, but would return all examination of witnesses to the traditional American rule. Discussing this approach, Solicitor
General Erwin Griswold pleaded that Rule 611(b) be changed to limit crossexamination of witnesses generally to matters contained in the direct. General Griswold's remarks are published in a Congressional Statement prepared
by the author of this Article, which Statement is printed in the Hearings
record of the House committee reviewing the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi2

" The Committee's Proposed Federal Rule 104(d) provides: "The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the case."
3401 F.2d 35, 38 n.5 (7th Cir. 1968).
44Hearings, note 6 supra, at 392. See a similar (although not identical approach) which is employed in Missouri
described in note 13 supra.
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dence. 45 The author's Statement first explains possibilities for limited revision of Rule 611(b), then explores other proposals for wholesale alteration
of the rule:
A second, perhaps cleaner, approach to the problem might be to return to the
advisory committee's original across-the-board proposal in this area. In their first
draft (1969), they promulgated this proposal for scope of cross-examination:
Rule 6-11. Mode and Order of Interrogationand Presentation.
(b) SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION. Cross-examination should
be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness. The judge may in the exercise of
discretion permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct exami46
nation.
This original approach by the committee would have kept cross-examination of
witnesses within the bounds presently adopted in federal courts as well as the vast
majority of state courts. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold pleaded for just such a
rule in 1972:
"Turning to another problem with respect to proof, Rule 61 1(b) would
permit cross-examination with regard to any issue in the case and credibility. Should not the scope of cross-examination be restricted to what has
traditionally been its limitation in the Federal courts and numerous state
courts, namely, the subject matter of direct examination and credibility?
"The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 611(b) indicates that the rule
was drafted in the interest of 'economy of time and energy.' However,
would not the rule be disruptive of an orderly presentation of a case?", 7
For a collection of other commentators and case authorities supporting the
majority "American" or "federal" rule of limited cross-examination (as opposed to
the "wide open" view), see Carlson, Cross-Examination of the Accused, 52 Cornell Law Quarterly 705, 706-708 (1967) (pointing out the U.S. Supreme Court's
solicitude in court decisions for the limited rule).

After extensive hearings on the Advisory Committee's draft, the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice made several changes in the Proposed
Federal Rules. Among these was a change in Rule 611(b). Under the bill
drafted by the House subcommittee, Rule 611(b) follows the more limited
view of cross-examination explained in the preceding Statement, using the
48
exact terms of Rule 6-11 as set forth therein.
CONCLUSION

On the scope of cross-examination problem, the drafting Advisory Committee originally (in 1969) recommended adoption of the traditional American view of limited cross-examination. In the 1971 draft the committee made
a dramatic shift, apparently by a one-vote margin, to the "wide open"
view. Again by a narrow, single vote, the reviewing Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure sustained the "wide open" approach. This
switch triggered debate and discussion over whether the narrow or wide open
view of cross-examination should control.
5

4 Carlson Statement, Hearings, note 6 supra, at 392.

46Preliminary Draft, Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates (1969). See Attorney
General Kleindienst's advocacy of this provision as the appropriate final rule in Hearings, note 6 supra, at 45-46, 50.
47Griswold, The Murray Lecture, September 21,1972, Iowa City, Iowa, p. 14-15.
SSee also, notes 4 and 5 supra and accompanying text. The House subcommittee stated as follows in support of
its approach:
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At least one problem with the Advisory Committee's "wide open" approach was its apparent failure to accommodate the significant constitutional considerations raised by this author, and adverted to in the recent edition
of McCormick's book, On Evidence. It would seem important to provide
guidance to federal judges and attorneys as to the proper scope of examination and especially important to do so when an accused person takes the
stand upon trial. The Advisory Committee's draft did provide such guidance
when the same defendant took the stand in support of a motion to suppress,49 but did not provide the accused person with protection from "wide
open" cross at trial. As indicated in United States v. Guajardo-Melendez,50
court decisions as well as the writings of the commentators appear to accord
accused persons the right to narrow cross-examination in the latter situation.
The House Subcommittee studying the Rules has reinstated the traditional American rule as the controlling principle in federal trials. Applying
this as the rule of cross-examination poses less potential for infringing upon
the constitutional rights of accused persons than the "wide open" approach.
The House subcommittee's draft provision is not inflexible, however. Ordinary witnesses in civil and criminal cases might well be examined with a
certain degree of latitude, for the Congressional subcommittee's draft authorizes some judicial discretion "to permit inquiry into [matters] additional" to
the direct.

Subcommittee Note
The Subcommittee amended subdivision (b) to return to the rule which prevails in the Federal courts and
39 State jurisdictions. As amended, the Rule is in the text of the 1969 draft; it limits cross-examination to
credibility and to matters testified to on direct examination, unless the judge permits more. This more traditional rule facilitates orderly presentations and progress at trial. Further, in the light of existing discovery
procedures, there appears to be no need to abandon the traditional rule.
"See
note 42 supra.
5
'Seenote 43 supra.

